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ARE ALL CONTRACTS ALIKE?
Margaret F. Brinig*
This Article compares two sets of contracts that are structurally
and contextually similar. They originate in two quite different
fields, however: the commercial arena and the family.' The
contracts come from two separate empirical investigations. The first
investigation studied 131 telecommunication interconnection
agreements made between SBC Communications, Inc. ("SBC")2 and
various local phone companies in Michigan beginning in 1998.' The
second investigation involved 141 divorce cases granted in 1998 in
Johnson County, Iowa, all of which involved children, and 130 of
which involved contracts, or "stipulations" as they are called locally.4
Though each empirical project has been described separately
elsewhere, this Article will consider them together.
What happens if a contract is not launched with rose-colored
expectations,5 but rather because one has to? This is the problem
* Fritz Duda Family Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. I
thank my colleagues and others who have encouraged me as I pursued this
project, especially Ian Ayres, Herbert Hovenkamp, Stephanos Bibas, and
Randall Bezanson.
1. See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (discussing the
separate law that developed for thinking about the family and the market and
its gendered effects).
2. SBC now hosts the former Southwestern Bell, Pacific Bell, Nevada Bell,
and Ameritech communication companies.
3. This project is described at length in Margaret F. Brinig, "Unhappy
Contracts": The Structure and Effect of Telecommunication Interconnection
Agreements (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper, Paper
No. 04-02, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=634223 [hereinafter
Telecommunications Agreements].
4. This project is described and analyzed at length in Margaret F. Brinig,
Unhappy Contracts: The Case of Divorce Settlements, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 241
(2005) [hereinafter Divorce Settlements].
5. An analogy to securities purchases was made by Lynn A. Stout, and to
engaged couples by Lynn A. Baker and Robert E. Emery. Lynn A. Stout, Are
Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities
Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 637 (1995) (describing how "personally
successful" investors will trade based on the "statistically mistaken belief that
they are better, brighter, or luckier than their fellow traders"); Lynn A. Baker &
Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and
533
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faced by incumbent and competing local phone companies who need
to negotiate contracts under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.6
It is also the problem that divorcing couples face when they
negotiate separation agreements. When the law forces parties to
contract over an extended period and they are not both willing
entrants into the new or reconfigured relationship, what
characterizes the contracts? What makes some contracts successful?
The punch line of this Article is that the two sets of agreements
are similar enough-and produce similar enough results-to be
studied together. There is much we can learn about how to write
long-term contracts when we see how clauses operate similarly-
and successfully-in two such different areas. However, skeptics
are right when they decry attempts to draw perfect analogies
between corporate affairs and marriages. In particular, the role of
fault in dissolving marital partnerships overwhelmed other
considerations that might have produced more successful contracts.7
It remains to be seen whether it is the prior bad relationship
(leading to the fault) that is responsible or just the emotional nature
of these marital dissolutions.
The role of child custody, or what some have described as a
public good or marital-specific investment, is another difference
between the divorce settlements and the interconnection
agreements. With dissolving families, what was jointly and
completely shared by both parents (their time with, control and
direction over, and enjoyment of children) changes to a pattern
where one parent's role largely remains the same (the custodial
parent) and the other parent's role converts to a qualitatively
different, and frequently quantitatively much smaller, status. The
presence of minor children (who economists would call third party
externalities and who may or may not be third party beneficiaries in
the legal sense) is what requires the majority of separation
agreements to be long-term relational contracts, and therefore
makes them similar to the telecom agreements. At the same time,
then, the change from the preseparation parenting relationship and
the complexities of trying to parent in the post-divorce reality make
these contracts different and raise the stakes well beyond those
typical of most commercial ventures.
The hypothesis that marriage contracts are different could be
tested empirically by examining a different species of contract from
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 439,
446 (1993) (describing how people about to be married "express thoroughly
idealistic expectations about both the longevity of their own marriages and the
consequences should they personally be divorced").
6. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-52 (2000).
7. See Divorce Settlements, supra note 4, at 260, 269 tbl.IX.
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the one studied here, such as a commercial agreement formed after
the parties had been disputing rather than at the beginning of their
business relationship. For example, a forced licensing of a patent
after successful litigation by the firm not holding the patent might
work, as might a long-term court-supervised order regulating
competition by someone who has left a firm, such as a real estate or
law firm. The answer to this interesting question will have to wait
for another day.
Realizing, too, that many readers will not be familiar with both
family law and complex commercial transactions, this Article will
first lay out the major similarities and differences between the
contracting environments and the agreements. The following
sections will briefly discuss the legal and factual backgrounds of
each area, and then will turn to detailed comparisons of the
development of contract terms, the terms themselves, and the
results they apparently cause. In each dimension in the Tables that
follow, only the factors that turned out to be statistically significant
are listed. For example, though hypothetically income and custody
would have played significant power roles in the divorce stipulation,
they did not.
20081 535
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TABLE I - SIGNIFICANT POWER FACTORS
Factor of Interest Telecom Agreements Divorce Stipulations
Attitude of the SBC always reluctant; Varies; Both spouses may
parties CLECs always enthusiastic be enthusiastic, one may, or
both may write the
stipulation with reluctance
Power dimensions Size and political power of Experience of attorney,
CLEC; Agreements are fault, independent assets of
usually, but not always, spouse
one-sided, with the balance
towards SBC
Method of reaching Made no difference whether Very important; Litigated
terms negotiated or arbitrated resolutions were much less
successful and provided for
children less often
Specific provision Length of contract very Length of contract (age of
for modification or important; No specific children) not important;
duration of contract modification provisions Case-specific modification
included provisions very important
Contract provision Payment dispute Never important
for dispute mechanism important
resolution
Power of Very important; Showed Unimportant, at least with
termination left in up in termination respect to custody
stronger party provisions, bank provisions, provisions
payment terms
Method of Amendment; Sometimes Amendment or stipulation
adjustment positive appearance before that agreement satisfied
PSC
Negative post- Usually SBC hearing, Usually motions in District
contractual sometimes litigation, Court, sometimes litigation,
experiences including appeals including appeals
Biggest surprises of Power of in-state location; Power of experienced
study Conclusion that method of attorneys; Conclusion that
resolution did not matter custody and related terms
did not matter for
measured outcomes.
I. THE TELECOM AGREEMENTS
Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in order
to resolve various monopoly problems in the local telephone
industry.9 The Act required that the five large regional telephone
8. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-
61).
9. The Justice Department had specifically charged that AT&T used its
service monopoly to restrict competition in the phone equipment manufacturing
market for the benefit of its subsidiary Western Electric. 141 CONG. REc.
S7881, S7882 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Larry Pressler).
536 [Vol. 43
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companies ("ILECs") allow local competitors ("CLECs") access to
their bandwidth, lines, switches, other facilities, and such services
as directory assistance and 911.10 They were to bargain
"voluntarily" with the CLECs, or, if they could not agree, submit to
arbitration by the local utility commission." The outcome of
bargaining or arbitration was to be a written contract that would
have to be approved by the commission.12 In return, the ILECs
would be allowed to continue to operate and would also be able to
enter the already competitive long distance market. 3
These contracts, called Telecommunications Interconnection
Agreements, are hardly what the ILECs would choose. (The ILECs
10. The Act imposed this requirement by allowing cable companies (and
others) to compete in phone service, and the Regional Bell Operating
Companies ("RBOCs") could begin to compete in long distance, should they
satisfy the "in region" test. An RBOC can satisfy the test as soon as a
competitor can compete independently. In some regions, especially New York,
cable companies were already capable of competing with the RBOC. Further,
the RBOCs can enter the equipment manufacturing market again. Regulation
of the telephone system is removed by the Act from the judiciary to the FCC.
The ILEC would no longer hold a monopoly in a local area. Mergers and
Competition in the Telecommunications Industry: Hearing Before the Sen.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (statement of William P. Barr, Senior Vice
President and General Counsel, GTE Corporation), available in Westlaw, 1996
WL 517476 (Sept. 11, 1996). Therefore, it is no longer an antitrust concern that
a local exchange carrier can leverage its monopoly power into other products
markets.
11. In Michigan, the local utility commission is the Michigan Public Service
Commission, or the PSC. See Michigan Public Service Commission,
http://www.michigan.gov/mpsc (last visited Mar. 2, 2008).
12. Commission rules usually require that an approved utility charge a
reasonable rate, make a profit that is not overly large, and generally act in the
public interest. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 required close monitoring
of the agreements between the ILECs and CLECs, including state regulatory
approval of the rates the ILECs could charge. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e). Although the
state had to approve the rates, the ILECs were allowed to make a small profit
on the sales of services and space to the CLECs. Mergers and Competition in
the Telecommunications Industry: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (statement of James D. Ellis, Senior Executive Vice
President and General Counsel, SBC Communications, Inc.), available in
Westlaw, 1996 WL 517574 (Sept. 11, 1996) (testifying about the merger
between SBC and Pacific Telesis) [hereinafter Ellis Statement].
13. Section 271 of the Act allows the ILEC to expand its service beyond its
Local Access and Transport Area ("LATA") if it satisfies an "in region" test. 47
U.S.C. § 271(b)(1), (d)(3). The test is satisfied if the ILEC can show that a
facilities-based competitor is present within the LATA. Id. § (c)(1)(A); see also
H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 170 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). A competitor becomes
facilities-based when it can "offer telephone exchange service either exclusively
over its own facilities or predominantly over its own facilities in combination
with the resale of another carrier's service." Id. at 147-48.
2008]
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were, to the extent that corporations can possess such feelings,
happy with being regulated monopolists and extracting the greater
than average return such a monopoly may provide, and attempted to
extract more than a larger profit from the CLECs until that pricing
was foreclosed by the FCC.)1 4 The CLEC, or entering local company,
generally expects to make money by providing low cost phone
service. Because both parties are not entering into these long-term
arrangements with the excitement and enthusiasm of most large
commercial ventures, I call the interconnection agreements
"unhappy contracts."
These contracts are complex (especially those that go beyond
phone service resale). Commensurate with the complexity and the
large amount of money involved, they are all in writing." Because of
the federal statute, they are all filed with the state utility
commission. 16  They require performance over a relatively long
period. This performance may be of many kinds, including such
"intimacies" as physical access to the ILECs' facilities.17 As the
14. SBC responded to the Act by hiring fifty negotiators, account managers,
and lawyers. Within six months it had entered into seventeen interconnection
agreements. Because they did so in order to enter into the interLATA (long-
distance) market, the Bells, including SBC, were initially enthusiastic.
However, in August 1996, the FCC issued a regulatory scheme that left
virtually nothing open to negotiation or arbitration. The specific problem was
the FCC's pricing below cost scheme that gave the ILECs no incentive to invest
in their relationship with the CLECs and the CLECs no incentive to create
their own independent networks, which was the necessary prerequisite for the
Bells entering long distance. See Ellis Statement, supra note 12, at *9.
Immediately after the FCC issued its regulations, each RBOC filed an action to
enjoin or overturn the rules. MCI Communications Corporation further alleged
that each agreement signed between an RBOC and a CLEC was interim in
nature and did not cover all the requirements of the checklist of Section 271.
Also, MCI has had to go to arbitration in twenty-eight states, while in other
situations the RBOC refused to negotiate with MCI. Mergers and Competition
in the Telecommunications Industry: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (statement of Michael H. Salsbury, MCI
Communications Corporation), available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 520160, at *8
(Sept. 11, 1996).
15. See Telecommunications Agreements, supra note 3, at 5.
16. 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1), (e)(1). The state agency in Michigan is
the Public Service Commission. Michigan Public Service Commission,
http://www.michigan.gov/mpsc (last visited Mar. 2, 2008).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (providing for unbundled access). The Act also
provides for collocation:
The duty to provide, on rates, terms, and conditions that are just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, for physical collocation of
equipment necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled
network elements at the premises of the local exchange carrier, except
that the carrier may provide for virtual collocation if the local
exchange carrier demonstrates to the State commission that physical
[Vol. 43
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"baby bells" have consolidated over time, at least one of the parties
to the agreements is a giant.'
8
II. THE DIVORCE CONTRACTS (PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS OR STIPULATIONS)
When couples divorce, they usually do not leave the sorting out
of their financial affairs and custody of their children to the courts. 19
About ninety percent of divorcing couples at some point file with the
court what is variously known as a separation agreement, a
property settlement agreement, or a stipulation." Like the telecom
agreements, these are complex documents in most cases, becoming
more so as the marriages lengthen and children are involved. They
must pass court muster to the extent they provide for children, 2' and
collocation is not practical for technical reasons or because of space
limitations.
§ 251(c)(6).
18. For the year 2003, SBC had revenues of $40.8 billion and had over
172,500 employees. See AT&T News Room, SBC Reports Strong 4th-Quarter
Long Distance Launch in Midwest, Improved Retail Access Line Trends, Record
Gains in Long Distance, DSL, http://www.att.com/gen/press-room
?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=20921 (last visited Mar. 2, 2008)
(reporting 2003 revenue); see also SBC Commc'ns, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form
10-Q) (Nov. 12, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data
/732717/000073271703000897/q303.htm. Current quarterly reports (since SBC
merged with AT&T) are available at http://www.att.com/gen/investor-
relations?pid=262 (last visited Mar. 2, 2008).
19. They may settle out of a general reluctance to litigate, see Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 956 (1979), or because a statute allows them to
divorce sooner if they do, see, for example, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (2004)
(allowing for divorce after a six-month separation when the parties have
entered into a separation agreement and have no minor children). They may
also wish to keep their financial affairs more private than they could expect if
they went to court.
20. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOcIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992) (discussing the prevalence of
divorce settlements). Eighty-eight percent of the couples in our study settled.
See infra tbl.III. In Iowa, having a written agreement allows the parties to be
divorced without a court hearing. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.8.2 (West 2001)
(requiring that the parties agree there is no prospect for reconciliation and that
jurisdictional requirements are met). In states such as Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-91(9) (2004) and New York, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 170(6) (McKinney 1999),
written agreements are required for a couple to divorce under the "no fault"
ground. In New York, amendments adding irreconcilable differences have been
suggested and seem to be making some progress this term. See Assemb. 6978,
2007 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
21. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.220(h)-(i) (2006) (describing how the
court shall use a heightened level of scrutiny of agreements concerning a minor
child to determine if the agreement is in the child's best interest); FLA. STAT.
2008] 539
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will need to do so if either party later wishes to resort to the court's
22
contempt power.
Courts, and even the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 23 note
that these family agreements are just a species of contract.24
However, their complexity, their subject matter, and the special
conditions under which they are made causes courts, and sometimes
legislatures, to be particularly careful when interpreting or
evaluating them.25  This care may take the form of scrutiny for
unconscionability 26 or a special attention to procedural regularity,27
ANN. § 61.183(2) (West 2005) (describing how a consent order agreed to through
mediation shall be reviewed by the court and, if approved, entered); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 153.007(a)-(b) (Vernon 2002) (providing that the court shall order
agreement between the parties for conservatorship and possession of the child if
it finds that the agreement is in the child's best interest); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
767.11(12)(a) (West 2001) ("The court may approve or reject the [mediation]
agreement, based on the best interest of the child."); Miller v. Miller, 620 A.2d
1161, 1165 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Schwab v. Schwab, 505 N.W.2d 752, 758 (S.D.
1993). But see PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.06(1) (2002) ("The court should order provisions of a
parenting plan agreed to by the parents, unless the agreement (a) is not
knowing or voluntary, or (b) would be harmful to the child."). Comment a to
Section 2.06(1) notes that "the law in most jurisdictions grants courts, as part of
their parens patriae authority, the authority to review a private agreement at
divorce to determine whether it serves the child's interests. This section takes a
more deferential view." Id. § 2.06, cmt. a.
22. Further, in some states, the agreement followed by divorce will provide
the final adjudication of spousal rights and responsibilities. See, e.g., NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 125.184 (LexisNexis 2004). If, after divorce, either discovers a
contractual defect, it may be too late to provide for relief under the court's
equitable powers since the jurisdiction over the marriage will have ended.
23. See, e.g., Swift v. Swift, 391 N.E.2d 930, 932 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 138 (Tentative Draft No. 3,
1967) (applying the third party beneficiary doctrine)); State ex rel. LaBarge v.
Clifford, 979 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (duty of good faith)).
24. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 21, §
7.01 cmt. d ("A premarital or marital agreement is a contract, and must
therefore satisfy all the applicable requirements of contract law.").
25. See generally Michael J. Trebilcock & Steven Elliott, The Scope and
Limits of Legal Paternalism: Altruism and Coercion in Family Financial
Arrangements, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAw: NEW ESSAYS 45 (Peter Benson
ed., 2001).
26. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 21, §
7.01, cmt. d ("Among the ordinary principles of contract law also applicable to
the contracts addressed by this Chapter is the rule of § 208 of Restatement
Second, Contracts, allowing a court to decline to enforce a contract term that it
finds 'unconscionable at the time the contract is made.' Courts have sometimes
gone beyond this rule to deny enforcement, under the rubric of
unconscionability, to a premarital agreement whose terms seem very unfair as
of the time enforcement is sought, even though its terms were not
[Vol. 43
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assistance of counsel,28 and disclosure.29
Negotiation of these agreements has been discussed elsewhere
in the legal and particularly the social science literature. ° The
results the parties reach will be affected by their relative bargaining
skills, the help provided by their attorneys, what they anticipate
they will receive if they go to court because they cannot reach
settlement,3' and other power dynamics. Hiding of assets and other
fault such as adultery, abuse, or substance abuse by either spouse
will also affect the bargaining outcomes. 2 Because these contracts
are made under less than auspicious circumstances and because
they are conditions, factually or legally, to exiting the marriage,
these, too, are "unhappy contracts."
III. BEHAVIOR PREDICTABLE IN UNHAPPY CONTRACTS
One possible outcome we might expect from unhappy contracts
would be the "separate spheres," or minimal performance, solution
envisioned by Lundberg and Pollak for unhappy couples remaining
unconscionable as of the time of contracting.").
27. See id. § 7.04 (creating a rebuttable presumption that a premarital
agreement was made with informed consent and not under duress when the
contract was executed at least thirty days before the parties' marriage, both
parties were advised to obtain independent counsel and had reasonable
opportunity to do so before execution, and in the case of unrepresented parties,
the language was easily understandable by an adult of ordinary intelligence
with no legal training).
28. Id. § 7.04(3)(b)-(c).
29. Id. § 7.04(5) (-To enforce terms that limit claims the other party would
otherwise have ... a party must show that prior to the agreement's execution
the other party knew, at least approximately, the moving party's assets and
income, or was provided by the moving party with a written statement
containing that information.").
30. Mediation of divorce cases, producing final agreements of this kind, has
become a legal trend as well as a powerful social movement. In some states
mediation is required in all such cases, and in others in cases where custody is
involved. See Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation, and the
Management of Divorce Practice, 28 LAw & Soc'y REV. 149, 152-53 (1994). It
may be ordered by the court or requested by either or both parties. Mediation
was not much of a feature in the Iowa cases (where only three of them were
mediated). Divorce Settlements, supra note 4, at 244 n.16.
31. This result is called the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, or
BATNA. See Alex J. Hurder, The Lawyer's Dilemma: To Be or Not To Be a
Problem-Solving Negotiator, 14 CLINIcAL L. REV. 253, 268 (2007).
32. Meg Lundstrom, A Way to 'Take the War Out' of Divorce, Bus. WK., Nov.
16, 1998, at 228 ("[Mediation is] not recommended for dissolving marriages
troubled by violence, alcoholism, or mental impairment. And without the
courts' discovery process, it doesn't work if either party is intent on hiding
assets.").
20081
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together.33 Lundberg and Pollak argued that instead of threatening
divorce, couples who were no longer happy would revert to the
minimum performance required of husbands and wives, or "separate
spheres" behavior.34  That is, wives would perform as good
housewives, and husbands as good breadwinners, because they
could not be criticized by outsiders or their spouses for this
performance. 35  The parallel predicted behavior in the telecom
context would be minimal compliance by SBC, which would draft
(adhesion) contracts that the CLEC was required to adopt if it
wanted to enter the market at all.36
In a related vein, we might also expect behavior to cluster
around certain foci or norms, as anticipated by Richard H. McAdams
in his important paper on social norms.37 The prediction for these
contracts would be a strong similarity of contract terms among
contracting parties. In fact, both the separate spheres and focal
point predictions seem borne out by my earlier work. In my
previous study of Michigan interconnection agreements, many of the
variables examined had only one or two solutions and gave
38tremendous power to the incumbent telephone company.
Similarly, despite drafting by different attorneys, many of the
33. See Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Separate Spheres Bargaining
and the Marriage Market, 101 J. POL. ECON. 988 (1993).
34. Id. at 990.
35. By extension, upon divorce, the parties would fall into the custody-in-
the-mother, child-support-in-the-father pattern that many couples adopt though
there is no legal reason to do so. Some couples may elect this expected pattern
even though these roles would not be their preference. See generally Maria
Cancian & Daniel R. Meyer, Who Gets Custody?, 35 DEMOGRAPHY 147, 147-49
(1998); Judith A. Seltzer & Vida J. Maralani, Joint Legal Custody and Child
Support Payments: Are There Lasting Custody Effects? 10 (Cal. Ctr. for
Population Research, Working Paper No. 004-01, 2001). A more modern norm,
not seen in these Iowa cases but suggested by the Iowa custody statutes enacted
in 2004, may be that the father needs to ask for custody (or at least joint
custody), even when that is not his true preference or the way the couple
parented before separation. The new Iowa statutes make joint physical custody
the "default" position, awarded whenever both parties are fit, one spouse has
asked for it, and there has not been any physical violence, unless the court
makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of law that joint physical custody
would not be in the child's best interest. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West 2000
& Supp. 2007). For a critique of this rule, see Margaret F. Brinig, Penalty
Defaults in Family Law: The Case of Child Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779
(2006).
36. The thirteen-state agreements drafted by SBC have this characteristic.
See Telecommunication Agreements, supra note 3, at 6.
37. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA.
L. REv. 1649 (2000). For a discussion of social norms generally, see ERIC A.
POSNER, LAW AND SocIAL NORMS (2000).
38. Telecommunications Agreements, supra note 3.
542 [Vol. 43
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divorce stipulations from Johnson County, Iowa, followed clear
patterns. 9 In particular, many provided for joint legal custody and
gave physical custody to wives with very substantial visitation by
husbands.4" Property was nearly always divided equally.4'
Unhappy contracting strategies aim to minimize losses, or
minimax, a term coined by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in their
discussions of game theory.42 How should contracts be structured to
achieve minimaxing, and how does a difference in the size or power
of the bargaining entities change the final settlement or contracting
result? Considering these contracts as a whole, and as if from a
43distance, the observer is struck by how franchise-like they are.
Many of them, and particularly the ones that have been successfully
amended over time, give great power to the CLEC or custodial
parent because so much is left unspecified. (Though the custodial
parent might be seen as the stronger party, analogous to SBC in our
Michigan agreements, custodial responsibilities make no difference
along power dimensions.44 However, the custodial parent is left with
making numerous day-to-day decisions.) On the other hand, many
of the more successful contracts are for relatively short periods of
time (one to three years before modification based upon the
39. Divorce Settlements, supra note 4.
40. Id. at 250-51.
41. Id. at 250, 262 tbl.I.
42. These discussions later turned into a book. See JOHN VON NEUMANN &
OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944).
43. For a law-and-economics discussion of franchise arrangements, see
Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1990) (explaining characteristics of
franchise agreements where the franchisor has bargaining power but difficulty
monitoring the franchisee). For its theoretical application to families, including
divorcing families, see Margaret F. Brinig, The Family Franchise: Elderly
Parents and Adult Siblings, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 393 (explaining that franchise-
like relationships exist after children are grown because parents want to
preserve certain family characteristics) and MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM
CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 188-
91, 194-96 (2000) (extending franchise-like relationship theory to divorced
couples and their children).
44. Of course, the parent with the power to break ties when the two conflict
does enjoy more power. See, e.g., Elk Grove Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004) (dismissing noncustodial parent's action for lack of standing because he
does not have an unrestricted right to inculcate in his daughter his beliefs).
However, to the extent that the noncustodial parent can threaten a custody
modification action or restrict the custodian's behavior such as smoking, see, for
example, Heagy v. Kean, 864 N.E.2d 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), or relocating out
of state (without being himself restricted), see, for example, In re Marriage of
LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004), that parent may enjoy significant power as
well. Because custody of a child is linked to child support, there may be
economic leverage as well.
5432008]
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children's age).45 Because they are for more than one year, they are
nonetheless specimens of relational contracts.46  General
characteristics of relational contracts are thus important to our
consideration of unhappy contracts.
Most relational contracts literature begins with the work of
Stewart Macaulay, who studied the contracting practices of
Wisconsin firms in the early 1960s.47 More recently, Professors Ian
Macneil48 and Robert Scott 49 have taken up the challenge of writing
45. Consensual modifications to the contracts occurred more often when the
oldest child was older (i.e., when the time for performance was relatively short).
Divorce Settlements, supra note 4, at 247 n.36.
46. See Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of
Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 823, 828 (2000).
47. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963). Macaulay found that the
parties specified time of performance, price, and quantity, but left most other
terms unspecified. See id. at 58-60. They did not resort to legal enforcement
when they "cancelled a contract," but rather freely adjusted contractual
relations as they went along. See id. at 61. Macaulay later extended his work
to several foreign countries in Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the
Complexities of Contract, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 507 (1977). A more recent
empirical look at contract terms is Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract
Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1. Weintraub sent a questionnaire to the
general counsels for 182 firms eliciting information on contract practices and
views as to desirable contract policy. Id. at 1-2. "Information included contract
devices used to protect against market shifts during long-term contracts, the
frequency with which companies request relief from or modification of
contractual obligations, the results of such requests, and the use of and extent
of reliance on firm offers." Id. at 1. Weintraub also asked whether corporate
executives would make more or less legalistic responses to a set of three
hypothetical business problems than would general counsel. Id. at 2.
Weintraub stresses nonlegal sanctions such as reputation costs, but notes the
increased use of litigation for contract disputes and the tendency of judges to
award even punitive damages for breach of contract cases. Id. at 7-8 & n.28.
In California from 1980 to 1984, "punitive damages were assessed
against 35% of defendants who were found to have breached
contracts." From the 1960s to the 1980s, the number of punitive
damage awards in business contract cases more than quintupled in
Cook County, Illinois, and more than quadrupled in San Francisco.
The total awards in constant dollars increased from less than
$500,000 in each of those jurisdictions in the 1960s to $14 million in
Cook County and $17 million in San Francisco during the first five
years of the 1980s.
Id. at 8 n.28 (quoting MARK PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL
FINDINGS viii (1987)) (citations omitted).
Two of Weintraub's respondents were from "utilit[ies] other than gas or
electricity." Id. at 15.
48. IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); see also Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment
of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational
Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978) (describing terms that may be
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about relational contracts, each generating several useful papers on
the subject. Macaulay, Macneil, and Scott all assume that in
complex, long-term contracting, many terms will be deliberately left
vague or not included at all. The parties, because of the strength of
their relationship and the substantial investments each has in the
venture," are likely to mutually agree to alter the contract as things
useful to promote easier modification). For a recent discussion of Macneil's
work, see Speidel, supra note 46. For a highly critical essay, see Randy E.
Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of
Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. 1175 (1992).
49. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An
Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980); Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089
(1981); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and
Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987); Robert E.
Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847,
849-53 (2000); see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as
Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998) (applying the relational
contracting theory to family law). For related work, see Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). All these works suggest that the courts will fill
the gaps left in contracts with "default rules": what the parties would probably
have agreed to had they thought about the problem at the time of contracting.
But see Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 313-15
(1992) (concluding that courts, lacking sufficient information about party intent
and market alternatives, are reluctant to intervene if the parties have failed to
agree).
50. On the role of reputation as a substitute for contract remedies, see
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 691 (1983). See also Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the
Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521, 559-60 (1985) ("The
existence of a custom and practice of adjustment in a particular contractual
setting indicates that parties in that setting are comfortable with the allocation
of risks that flow from that custom."); Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation and
Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 62 LA. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (2002)
("Reputation is particularly effective in relational situations because long-term
contracts tend to be incompletely contingent; as a consequence, the specific
obligations of the parties, and hence the existence of breach, are highly
uncertain. Ex post enforcement costs will therefore be high, and ex ante
constraints such as reputation can therefore compensate for the risk of
underenforcement."); Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the
Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne
Fairs, 2 EcON. & POL. 1, 3 (1990) ("It is well known . . . that in long-term,
frequent bilateral exchange, the value of the relationship itself may serve as an
adequate bond to ensure honest behavior and promote trust between the
parties."); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75
CAL. L. REV. 2005, 2026-27 (1987).
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change.51
Thus, Macneil's colleague Richard Speidel writes in a recent
piece (that also summarizes previous scholarship on relational
contracting):
First, the exchange relationship extends over time. It is
not a "spot" market deal. Rather, it is more like a long-term
supply contract, a franchise or distribution arrangement, or a
marriage. Second, because of the extended duration, parts of
the exchange cannot be easily measured or precisely defined at
the time of contracting. This dictates a planning strategy that
favors open terms, reserves discretion in performance to one or
both parties, and incorporates dispute resolution procedures,
such as mediation or arbitration, into the contract. The
inability of the parties to "presentiate" the terms of the
bargain at the time of contracting shifts the focus to
circumstances and conduct that occur ex post contract. Third,
in the words of Lewis Kornhauser, in a relational contract the
"interdependence of the parties to the exchange extends at any
given moment beyond the single discrete transaction to a
range of social interrelationships."52
To summarize, unlike most contracts, through which parties
seek to maximize profits, unhappy contracts feature terms designed
to minimize the losses of at least one contracting party. In the
telecom agreements, the least happy party is the ILEC, the
incumbent forced by the state to allow competing companies access
51. Professor Weintraub notes:
Relational contracts involve parties who are presently performing
a long-term contract or have dealt with one another many times in the
past and are likely to do so in the future. Discrete contracts involve
parties who have not dealt with one another before or, if they have,
probably will not contract again. Relational contracts are likely to
predominate in well-organized markets; discrete contracts will typify
sales that take place sporadically, such as sales of real estate. There
are important differences between situations in which parties have
developed a relationship and those in which the contract is an isolated
occurrence. When a dispute arises, parties with a history of mutually
beneficial dealings are less likely to resort to litigation than are
strangers. Efficiency is one incentive for amicable resolution of a
relational dispute. Each party has custom-shaped its operations to
meet the other's needs and these transaction costs would be wasted if
the relationship ended. Moreover, in well-organized markets where
relational contracts predominate, a reputation for litigiousness is
particularly undesirable.
Weintraub, supra note 47, at 19-21 (footnotes omitted).
52. Speidel, supra note 46, at 823-24 (footnotes omitted). For other work
by Speidel, see Symposium, Law, Private Governance and Continuing
Relationships, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 461, 483-579 (selected bibliography in app. A).
The existence and importance of relational contracts in the real world has also
been verified in an empirical study. Weintraub, supra note 47, at 16-24.
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not only to the local market but also to equipment and services. The
goals of the ILEC (in addition to being profitable generally) are to
minimize conflict, minimize money spent (particularly transaction
costs), and minimize the impact on the firm of doing business with
CLECs. The terms of the interconnection agreements are
constrained by the need to get the approval of the local public utility
53
commission. Because the contracts (and any amendments) are
required to be filed in one place, and because all subsequent
disputes are to be litigated in federal district court in the state of
contracting, it would theoretically be possible to get a complete set of
these agreements. In the interest of time, I focused on one state and
one ILEC, SBC (formerly known as Ameritech and as Michigan
Telephone). This group of contracts was attractive because they
were all available for downloading from the SBC website,54 and
because the proceedings of the Michigan Public Service Commission
were also all available on its website.55
Though one spouse must ultimately file for divorce, spouses
typically do not do so joyously or with thought of great profit, but
reluctantly, fearfully, and with some sadness.56 Typically, as noted
above, it is the woman who actually files for divorce,57 and there is
some evidence that they, more often than their husbands, are the
ones who "want out."58 Divorce is usually a last resort, an admission
that one has made a mistake or that difficulties just could not be
worked out. Divorce is the lesser of two evils (the greater seen as
staying married). 9 The contract itself is another step towards
53. 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).
54. AT&T Regulatory Documents, http://www.att.comlsearch/regulatory.jsp
?category=INTERCONNECTIONAGREEMENTS/MICHIGAN (last visited
Mar. 2, 2008).
55. Michigan Public Service Commission, Schedules, Agendas, and
Minutes, http://www.cis.state.mi.us/mpsc/orders/minagen.htm (last visited Mar.
2, 2008).
56. Interestingly, this situation parallels with some wedding ceremonies.
See, e.g., Manchester City Council, How to Arrange a Marriage,
http://www.manchester.gov.uk/site/scripts/documents-info.php?documentID=64
4 (last visited Mar. 2, 2008); Traditional Christian Wedding Ceremony,
http://jstephenconn.com/page8.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2008) ("[Marriage] is
therefore not to be entered into unadvisedly or lightly; but reverently,
discreetly, advisedly and in the fear of God.")
57. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, "These Boots Are Made for
Walking": Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 126-
27 (2000). Seventy-eight percent of the divorce filings in the Johnson County
sample were by women. Divorce Settlements, supra note 4, at 250-51.
58. Sanford Braver et al., Who Divorced Whom? Methodological and
Theoretical Issues, 20 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1, 7 (1993).
59. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD.
35, 37 (1978).
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admitting failure. The goals may be to shorten the waiting period 60
to prove that divorce is sought (or at least uncontested) by both,6'
and to establish some financial or other certainty for a dependent
62
spouse. Divorce agreements are filed during the divorce
proceedings with the clerk of court and, because they are
incorporated into a final decree, kept with the court's record for each
case. After divorce, these agreements, along with all the other
proceedings and discovery in the case, may be a matter of public
record.63
Thus, both the telecom agreements and the divorce stipulations
involve relational contracts made subject to governmental
supervision. The overwhelming bulk of the parties were able to
reach agreements in both cases: only eleven percent of the telecom
agreements were not consensual, and only twelve percent of the
divorce cases did not result in stipulations.6 The situations were
not identical, however. Most obviously, the telecom agreements
involve commercial enterprises, sometimes large ones. The family
contracts were always made between husband and wife, though the
ones examined here all involved their minor children as well.
Moreover, the telecom agreements, while reluctantly executed by
the incumbents (in our case, SBC), were enthusiastically approached
by the local competing companies, or CLECs. In many cases of
divorce, neither party is enthusiastic about obtaining an agreement.
In many cases, the spouses may approach divorce itself reluctantly,
and may only make an agreement because the alternative,
litigating, is worse. The less happy nature of the divorce contract
also affects post-divorce results: these cases averaged nearly two
negative post-divorce contacts with the court compared to an
average of slightly less than one negative post-agreement contact
with the Public Service Commission or court in the telecom cases.65
60. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (2004) (allowing for divorce after a
six-month separation when the parties have entered into a separation
agreement and have no minor children).
61. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.8.2.a(1) (West 2001) (allowing couples
with a written agreement to obtain a decree of dissolution without a hearing).
62. Cf PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 21, §
4.02(3) ("The objective of this Chapter is to allocate property by principles ...
that are consistent and predictable in application."); Id. § 7.02 cmt. b
("Agreements also give parties greater certainty about the future, and about the
consequences of their actions.").
63. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.10 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) (domestic
abuse files); Id. § 22.3A (open records law generally).
64. Divorce Settlements, supra note 4, at 266; Telecommunications
Agreements, supra note 3, at 23.
65. Divorce Settlements, supra note 4, at 266; Telecommunications
Agreements, supra note 3, at 43 n.34.
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About thirty percent of the divorce cases had post-divorce
modifications, while nearly two-thirds of the telecom cases featured
subsequent amendments.66  Both of these percentages were
considered positive adjustments to changing circumstances.
Both sets of bargaining units used power to their advantage,
though power had a different meaning in the two contexts. In the
telecom cases, power was characterized sometimes by pure size:
whether or not the company was publicly traded or how many
employees it had. Sometimes the power seemed to be political: the
companies that reached more generous bargains with SBC tended to
be those located within the state of Michigan." In the family law
context, power sometimes meant higher income or more substantial
individual assets.66 In many cases, though, the better terms seemed
to stem not from the parties but from the attorneys who were more
experienced in family law." (This, of course, may be directly related
to wealth, or perhaps a better knowledge of the family law
community.) Education, which might have indicated greater
earning capacity for spouses ending marriages, did not appear to
predict contract terms. (That is, it was not statistically significantly
correlated with any terms.)
A. Closer Comparison: Litigate Versus Settle
The commercial and family law contexts differed substantially
in one area. The arbitrate/reach agreement split in the telecom
cases does not parallel the decision to go to divorce court as opposed
to settling a divorce case. Arbitration seems to be correlated with
power-publicly held parties, longer payment terms, longer initial
terms, more flexible terms for disputed amounts, and broad general
statements rather than minutia as in the thirteen-state agreements.
The agreements that resulted in arbitration tended (at .05) to be
written earlier than other agreements in our sample, and therefore
had simply endured longer, which could possibly account for there
being both more positive and more negative entries in the PSC
minutes.7' The frequency of interaction could also indicate more
feelings of security about access to the PSC (which also held the
arbitrations, of course).
In family law, the decision to litigate rather than settle is more
66. Divorce Settlements, supra note 4, at 266; Telecommunications
Agreements, supra note 3, at 23.
67. See Divorce Settlements, supra note 4, at 253; Telecommunications
Agreements, supra note 3, at 14.
68. Telecommunications Agreements, supra note 3, at 13.
69. Divorce Settlements, supra note 4, at 250.
70. Id. at 253.
71. Telecommunication Agreements, supra note 3, at 29-30.
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closely connected with fault grounds than with traditional indicators
of power such as income. Not surprisingly, litigation results in more
motions (both before and after divorce). Less obviously, the parents
who litigate their divorce are very unlikely to provide for their
children's college education or to provide for generous visitation by
72the non-custodial parent. (In either case, this could be because
they dislike each other so much they are willing to sacrifice their
child's well-being.) The presence or absence of fault grounds is also
unrelated to traditional power. Fault is, however, correlated
positively with the presence of a religious upbringing clause in the
settlement agreement.73 Perhaps more significantly, it is negatively
related to terms providing for college education, maintaining life
insurance, or providing for adjustment if there are changes in
income (all provisions that would benefit the couple's children, who
are certainly not parties to the agreement and frequently have
nothing to do with their parents' marital problems).74  Like cases
that cannot settle (and perhaps because of the greater litigation
associated with fault grounds), cases that begin with fault result in
more pre- and post-divorce motions. Fault is thus probably a key
difference between the two types of contracts. It is unclear from this
evidence whether it is the emotional content of fault grounds-the
essential violation of marital trust-that makes these cases
different, or whether fault is merely a (powerful) symptom of a bad
prior relationship preceding the contract (as opposed to one that is
begun with no such bad prior history). It might be possible to tease
out the real culprit here with a study of business contracts, some of
which were preceded by a prior bad contracting experience between
the parties, some not.7 ' For example, theoretically the same firm
72. Divorce Settlements, supra note 4, at 254, 265.
73. Id. at 252, 265.
74. Id. at 264-66 tbl.II.
75. To the extent that we can tell from the current study, the "prior bad
relationship" story is not inconsistent with the results. For example, AT&T,
MCI, and GTE were all involved in litigation against SBC's predecessors under
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. These three firms also have the largest
number of post-contractual negative contacts. AT&T, which had nine negative
contacts, was involved on opposite sides of litigation with Michigan Bell, SBC's
predecessor. AT&T Info. Sys. v. FCC, 854 F.2d 1442 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Since the
1996 Act, it has joined or begun six different lawsuits against SBC (or
Ameritech). AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (naming
Ameritech as a party); Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 566
(7th Cir. 1999); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Strand, 26 F. Supp. 2d 993 (W.D. Mich.
1998); Ind. Bell Tel. Co. v. McCarty, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (S.D. Ind. 1998); AT&T
Commc'n of Mich., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 60 F. Supp. 2d 636 (E.D. Mich.
1998); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., No. 97 C 2225, 1998 WL
156678 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1998). GTE, involved in six negative PSC contacts,
was involved in a suit against Michigan Bell both before and after the 1996 Act.
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might license patents voluntarily and because a court ordered
licensing. If the resulting licensing agreements were studied and
compared (both as to contents and later durability), the two groups
might produce differences similar to the differences in the fault
divorce cases compared to those which did not reveal fault.
An observer steeped in the Alternative Dispute Resolution
("ADR") literature would hypothesize that open-ended, or more
relaxed, terms might signal the basic trust needed for a relationship
to adjust well over time. In fact, this turns out to be so, at least for
obviously financial terms, such as bank-related clauses in the
76 chiltelecom agreements and child support arrangements" in the
divorce cases. However, terms related to custody, and generous
amounts of time given to each parent, surprisingly turned out to
predict absolutely nothing about the agreement itself, nor about the
parties' abilities to adjust.
B. Thirteen-State Contracts: The Separate Spheres Solution
A number of the Michigan contracts were thirteen-state
agreements, negotiated with SBC for their entire territory.
Although these companies all expanded beyond more than one state
in terms of size, the resulting agreements demonstrate the much
Sw. Bell Corp. v. FCC, 896 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Engler, 72 F. App'x 380 (6th Cir. 2003). The most litigious, both before and
after the 1996 Act, has been MCI WorldCom (with twelve negative PSC
appearances). Prior to the Act came Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 988
F.2d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1993) and MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 917
F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Since the Act, MCI WorldCom has been involved in
several cases. Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. MCI MetroAccess Transmission Servs.,
Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (regarding fax change orders); MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Mich. 1999)
(regarding performance benchmarks and local loop access); Mich. Bell Tel. Co.
v. Strand, 26 F. Supp. 2d 993 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (regarding a "common
transport" regulation); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. MFS Intelnet of Mich., 16 F. Supp.
2d 828 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (regarding reciprocal calls). Since the 1996 Act, these
three companies have carried the burden of litigation that also benefits smaller
carriers. For example, in the current case of Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic, 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted in part sub nom.
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 538 U.S. 905
(2003), AT&T is the real party in interest. Conversation with Professor Herbert
Hovenkamp, University of Iowa College of Law, in Iowa City, Iowa (Feb. 17,
2004).
76. Such terms include the time within which the ILEC needed to be
notified of the CLEC's bank and the time within which the ILEC needed to be
notified of a change in bank, in addition to the extension of credit after the
CLEC provided facilities, bandwidth, or services.
77. These terms include adjustments in child support related to the age of
the child or children, adjustments related to the income of either or both
parties, and other explicit adjustment provisions.
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greater power of SBC than the CLEC in question. Being a thirteen-
state agreement as opposed to one uniquely negotiated for Michigan
was positively correlated with a number of characteristics. These
contracts are significantly and positively related to various formal
procedures, including longer periods for negotiation, longer periods
of extension specified, longer notice to be given before termination
for breach, more complicated and lengthier contracts, and ADR
specified as a dispute resolution procedure."8
The thirteen-state agreements were negatively related to a
number of power-demonstrating characteristics, such as publicly
held status, place of business in Michigan, initial term length,
number of required meetings, number of days to request
renegotiation of non-renewal, number of days to pay sums due, and
number of days to notify of the CLEC's bank and change of that
bank.7' There were also fewer positive or negative entries in the
PSC minutes for this group of contracts, perhaps reflecting a lack of
confidence that appearances before the PSC would be fruitful
(though these were also more recent contracts at .05 level).80
Though this was not a significant correlation, the sign on
amendments of the agreement was also negative.
C. Full Custody to Mothers and Child-Support by Fathers:Another
Separate Spheres Solution
As noted above, a return to very traditional arrangements was
the hallmark of Lundberg and Pollak's unhappy couples.
Traditional marriages, where the wife did not work outside the
home, might present the opportunity for a return to traditional roles
upon divorce. In these relationships, the wives would continue to
care for children, and the husbands would stop participating in
household affairs and simply pay child support and alimony. But
since most married women now work outside the home8'
(particularly in Iowa, which has one of the highest rates of two-
earner couples in the country),82 and very little alimony is awarded
anywhere, and particularly not in Iowa, a post-divorce "separate
spheres" model looks unrealistic. However, in 2002 it might still
have been possible, at least in the parenting sense. Regardless of
78. Telecommunications Agreements, supra note 3, at 23-24.
79. Id. at 23-24 tbl.I, 25 tbl.II.
80. Id. at 29-30.
81. FRANCINE D. BLAU ETAL., THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN AND WORK 85
(4th ed. 2002) (showing sixty percent in 2000).
82. See Lifestyle Statistics: Percent of Married-Couple Families
with Both Husband and Wife in the Labor Force (2004),
http://www.statemaster.com/graph/lifper-ofmar famwit-bot-hus-and-wif in
the lab_for-both-husband-wife-labor-force.
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how much time fathers spent with their children before separation,
there may be very traditional and gendered patterns upon divorce.
In fact, although nearly all (90%) of the divorces involved "joint
legal custody,"" and 69% involved generous sharing of custody, only
7.1% (ten cases) had approximately equal time shares, 4 and "[o]nly
another 10 cases had father custody."85 This means that the vast
majority (roughly eighty-six percent) featured primary maternal
physical custody.86 The agreements varied widely in their treatment
of visitation: some did not include schedules at all, while others had
very complex visitation schedules (up to twenty-one paragraphs of
treatment). The more complicated the schedule, the less likely that
one parent had "sole custody," and the more likely that the
attorneys involved were very experienced with other cases in the
sample. These complicated schedules were also related to having
provisions specifying religious upbringing and education.
"Generous sharing" means that most divorce settlements
provided for each parent to get some reasonable share of physical
custody. Complete loss of custody occurred in only a few extreme
cases.8 7 Additionally, a number of the agreements provided that the
custodial parent could not move the children out of a specified area
(sometimes the metropolitan area, sometimes within 50 or 100
miles, sometimes out of state) without the relocation becoming a
83. IOwA CODE ANN. § 598.41(5) (2001) provides:
Joint physical care may be in the best interest of the child, but joint
legal custody does not require joint physical care.... If one joint
custodial parent is awarded physical care, the parent responsible for
providing physical care shall support the other parent's relationship
with the child. Physical care awarded to one parent does not affect
the other parent's rights and responsibilities as a joint legal custodian
of the child. Rights and responsibilities as joint legal custodian of the
child include, but are not limited to, equal participation in decisions
affecting the child's legal status, medical care, education,
extracurricular activities, and religious instruction.
In contrast, Michael Newdow, the plaintiff in the recent Supreme Court case of
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, did not have prudential standing
to attack the pledge of allegiance under the Establishment Clause because his
wife had "sole legal custody as to the rights and responsibilities to make
decisions relating to the health, education and welfare of 'her daughter.'" Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 14 (2004) (internal quotations
omitted).
84. Divorce Settlements, supra note 4, at 251.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 261. For data describing different variables in cases resulting in
sole custody arrangements or with less than thirty percent of the time going to
the noncustodial spouse, see Table II, infra.
About a quarter of these involved allegations of abuse of a child or the other
parent. Id. at 261 n.87.
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change of circumstances requiring reassessment of custody.8  For a
noncustodial parent, the greatest fear may well be losing touch with
one's children by having them move away.
TABLE II - VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION
SOLE CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT
Variables
Entered on
Step 1 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Age .122 .080 2.297 1 .130 1.129
difference
Number of -.151 .359 .178 1 .673 .859
minor
children
Fault 1.320 .665 3.946 1 .047 3.744
grounds for
divorce
Substantial -.650 .769 .714 1 .398 .522
assets
Joint .970 .763 1.615 1 .204 2.638
physical
custody
Case -.679 .672 1.022 1 .312 .507
resolved by
agreement
Complicated -.369 .099 14.039 1 .000 .691
custody
arrangement
Provision -.567 .653 .755 1 .385 .567
concerning
removal of
child from
state
Constant .228 1.213 .035 1 .851 1.256
Also, "[p]rovisions limiting
custodial spouse relocated were
or suggesting changes when the
more common when the wife was
older when she married, when the couple had assets of more than
$100,000 and when the husband possessed independent wealth."89
The first correlation suggests that these wives might be more
mobile, while the last two suggest that there might be property in
Iowa that would be difficult for the non-custodial parent to leave
behind.
This observation relates to our original prediction that parties
select contract terms to minimize potential losses. Unlike the
88. Id. at 261.
89. Id. at 254.
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commercial franchise contract with which it shares many features,
the separation agreement (or stipulation) typically cannot last for a
short time specified in advance, thus reducing the risk of big losses.
When children are involved, provisions for their custody and support
must control during their minority,90 in the analyzed cases at least
four years.
However, many of the contracts in the Johnson County sample
contained other terms that suggest the parties were trying to
minimize their losses. For example, were the matter to be
relitigated at a later date, the provisions for automatic adjustments
(for age or income) would minimize the possibility of getting a larger
(to the noncustodial spouse) or smaller (to the custodial spouse)
child support award. In other words, these provisions reduce the
variance in the amount of future child support.9'
Other contract provisions further insulate one or both spouses
from future losses. In the Johnson County contracts, "[aill alimony
awards that were agreed to (and, remember, there were only 8 of
these) were for fixed periods (in only two cases for more than 60
months, and one of these was for $1 per month)."92 For the payor
spouses (all husbands), this short term would limit their exposure,
potentially for the remainder of their working careers.
CONCLUSIONS
Relational contracts entered into under less than happy
circumstances differ from more common contracts. They are drawn
to minimize loss rather than maximize gain. As the parties
approach equal size, more terms are left open and terms become
90. Courts invalidate provisions designed to remove judicial oversight from
child support or custody cases. See, e.g., Anthony v. Anthony, 204 N.W.2d 829
(Iowa 1973) (holding that an agreement by a custodial parent to waive child
support in return for a promise by the noncustodial parent not to exercise
visitation rights was void as contrary to public policy). See also IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.21(8) (West 2001) ("[A] modification of a support order ... is void unless
the modification is approved by the court, after proper notice and opportunity to
be heard is given to all parties to the order, and entered as an order of the
court."); Goodpasture v. Goodpasture, 371 S.E.2d 845 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
91. For a discussion of the reduction of variance in the context of the parol
evidence rule, see Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning
Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 533,
543 (1998):
This alternative characterization would not affect the analysis for
parties that are risk-averse, since such parties are willing to pay for a
reduction in variance. Even risk-neutral parties would prefer the
reduction in variance because the uncertainty of the legal decision in
case of a dispute would cause parties to incur greater litigation costs
than they would if the legal decision could be accurately predicted.
92. Divorce Settlements, supra note 4, at 261.
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longer. These observations include both the commercial contracts
studied and the family contracts. Yet the two realms differ in one
important respect. Fault plays an important role in the divorce
cases (perhaps not so much because private lives are involved, but
because marriages are breaking up, that is, relationships are ending
as the contracts are beginning).9 Fault makes the contracts much
less durable and inhibits the contracting spouses' ability to provide
for their children. On balance, however, this preliminary study
indicates that we can usefully make many comparisons between
commercial and family contracting.
TABLE III - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Manifestation Minimum Maximum Mean
Number of
Contracts
Telecom 131
Divorce 138
Year of Contract
Telecom 1998
Divorce 1996 2002 2000.62
Term of Contract
Telecom Initial Term 1 3 1.82
Divorce Age of youngest 14 0 10.84
child
Percent to Settle
Telecom Consensual or 0 1 .89
arbitrated
Divorce Stipulation or 0 1 .88
court order
Negative
contacts
Telecom PCS hearing, .00 12.00 .5344
litigation
Divorce Motion, 0 13 1.96
litigation
Positive Contacts
Telecom Amendments, 0 5 .66
positive hearing
PSC
Divorce Amendments, 0 3 .30
1 stipulations
93. For a recent paper suggesting that fault (a negligence standard rather
than strict liability) play some role in commercial contracts, see Eric A. Posner.,
Fault in Contract Law (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 396,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1106399.
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TABLE IV - POWER
Impact on Generosity
Variable Manifestation of Terms
9 4
POWER
1. Political
Telecom In-state +++
Divorce Experienced attorney +++
2. Financial
Telecom Publicly traded ...
Telecom Employees ++
Divorce Income difference +
Individual assets (W) -
TABLE V - DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EFFECT OF OPEN TERMS ON
POSITIVE ENTRIES IN PSC MINUTES OR AMENDMENTS
Telecom Notice of termination
Days to appoint representative
Divorce (child support Income difference of spouses
adjustments) ...
Divorce (child support Individual assets of wife
adjustments)
94. The symbol "+++" means positive direction, statistically significant at
.001. "++" means positive direction, statistically significant at .05. "+" means
positive direction, statistically significant at .1. "-" means negative direction,
statistically significant at .1. The terms are drawn from Tables II and III,
supra.
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